We study, both theoretically and in the lab, the performance of open outcry debt and equity auctions in the presence of both private information and hidden e¤ort in an independent private value setting. We characterize symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies and show that these lead to e¢ cient allocation. More interestingly, the revenue ranking between the debt and equity auctions depends on the returns to entrepreneurial e¤ort. When returns are either very low or vary high, the equity auction leads to higher expected revenues to the seller than does the debt auction. When the returns to e¤ort are intermediate, we show that debt auctions can outperform equity auctions. We then test these predictions in a controlled laboratory setting and …nd broad support for the comparative predictions of the model.
Introduction
The cornerstone of auction theory, the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson 1981) , suggests that in an ex ante symmetric independent private values setting, the form of the auction does not a¤ect a seller's revenues. That is, a …rst-price auction, an English auction, or a host of other ways of auctioning o¤ a particular item have no e¤ect on either the allocation of the object or the expected revenues to the seller. The practical applications of this theorem are vast and well-documented (see, for instance, Klemperer 2003) . One possible area where auction theory has been fruitfully applied is in the area of competition among …rms to acquire a valuable asset. Here, the key issue is how the auction a¤ects the acquiring …rm's balance sheet. Hansen (1985) points out that, in a symmetric independent private values setting, a seller running an English auction obtains strictly higher revenues by selling the object through bidding in the form of equity rather than bidding in the form of cash or debt. In a recent important paper, De Marzo, et al. (2005) consider a more general structure of auctions for debt, equity, and so on while varying auction forms. However, in all of the extant literature, the fundamental problem is one of private information-the buyer has a better view of his or her value of acquiring the asset than does the seller.
Yet, in many situations, the problem of the seller is not simply one of hidden information, but also hidden action-the e¤ect of the auction on the acquiring …rm's balance sheet a¤ects managerial incentives and these, in turn, a¤ect the value of the asset and, consequently, the returns to the seller in conducting the auction. An important area where the joint problem of private information and managerial e¤ort both a¤ect the returns to the seller is in the area of venture capital …rms negotiating with several interested entrepreneurs to determine which, if any, of the entrepreneurs to both …nance and o¤er expertise. In this case, the revenue ranking identi…ed by Hansen becomes more problematic. While conducting an English auction where bids are in the form of equity is superior at extracting the surplus from the private values component of the project, it undermines the incentives of the entrepreneur to exert e¤ort possibly leading to a worse outcome than if debt contracts were o¤ered. Indeed, this observation appears in a purely hidden action context dating back to the seminal results of Jensen and Meckling (1976) . In addition, Hansen abstracts away from the fact that the winning bidder typically enjoys protection in the form of limited liability; therefore, the "payment" of winning bidder in the form of a debt contract does not represent the actual …nancial return to the seller. In this paper, we examine, both theoretically and through controlled laboratory experiments, how the choice between auctions for debt and equity a¤ect the returns to the seller.
Our theory model di¤ers from the standard independent private values model of auction theory in the following ways: (1) Bidders can exert unobservable e¤ort which a¤ects the valuation of the asset. As we will show, the amount of e¤ort exerted typically depends on the outcome of the auction; meanwhile, bidding in the auction depends on the valuation of the asset. Equilibrium, of course, factors both e¤ects in simultaneously. ( 2) The protection a¤orded by limited liability di¤ers depending on the structure of the auction and the riskiness of the future cash ‡ows derived from the asset being sold. This in turn a¤ects equilibrium bidding behavior. As we show, the presence of limited liability has a qualitative e¤ect on equilibrium bidding in debt auctions compared to the standard case of unlimited liability. This is not the case with equity auctions. To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst paper to analyze equilibrium bidding in securities in the presence of unobservable e¤ort, private information, and limited liability. We are also the …rst to test such models in controlled laboratory settings.
To …x ideas, it is useful to consider the following setting: Successfully obtaining …nancing from venture capital …rms is critical to the success of the business idea of an entrepreneur. The problem, of course, is that this …nancing, and the managerial expertise that accompanies it, is a scarce resource over which entrepreneurs must compete. Viewed from the perspective of a venture capital …rm, the problem of choosing among competing business ideas presented by entrepreneurs is daunting. Often these ideas are su¢ ciently novel and the markets these businesses propose to serve su¢ ciently undeveloped, that gaining an accurate picture of the quality of the business idea of a given entrepreneur is tremendously di¢ cult.
In practice, venture capital …rms try to solve the problem of determining "which horse to back"in a variety of ways: by listening to presentations, by reading business and marketing plans, by undertaking independent studies of the markets the entrepreneurs propose to serve, and so on. But there is an additional important source of information available to venture capital …rms in making funding decisions-the negotiation with and competition among entrepreneurs to secure scarce funding opportunities. Speci…cally, we consider competition for scarce …nancing resources under two sorts of contractual schemes: o¤ers of debt …nancing and o¤ers of equity …nanc-ing. Under the debt …nancing scheme, the competing entrepreneurs "bid" against one another in the form of debt contracts to obtain scarce …nancing. We model this bidding competition as an open outcry auction and show that the equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies leads the company with the more valuable business plan to always be selected. However, in practice, debt …nancing schemes are rarely used in venture capital …nancing arrangements. A more common scheme is one were venture capital …nancing is o¤ered in exchange for an equity share of the company. Accordingly, we also model competition among entrepreneurs where the "bids" consist of o¤ers of control percentages of the company to the venture capital …rm in exchange for …nancing. Again, we model this as an open outcry auction and …nd an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. In this equilibrium the higher valued project is always selected.
So why is it that equity schemes are common while debt schemes are not? Clearly, both are equally e¢ cient in determining the quality of the business ideas of competing entrepreneurs. Moreover, the inherent quality of the business idea is not the only determinant of a successful business. Entrepreneurial e¤ort is often critical to the value of a start-ups …nanced by venture capital …rms. Accordingly, we enrich the model by adding entrepreneurial e¤ort, which cannot be directly observed nor contracted upon, to the model and examine the performance of debt and equity auctions where both private information about the quality of the business idea as well as the level of entrepreneurial e¤ort a¤ect the value of the company. Our main …ndings are as follows:
1. Regardless of the e¤ect of entrepreneurial e¤ort, both debt and equity auctions succeed in selecting the higher quality business idea with probability one.
2. When the returns to entrepreneurial e¤ort are either very high or very low, the equity auction leads to strictly higher payo¤s to the venture capital …rm.
3. When the returns to entrepreneurial e¤ort are intermediate the debt auction can yield higher expected payo¤ to the venture capital …rm.
We then test these results in a controlled laboratory experiment. Our main treatments are to vary the structure of the auction and the returns to entrepreneurial e¤ort. To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to compare the performance of debt versus equity auctions in the lab. Overall, under a variety of performance metrics, we …nd broad support for the comparative predictions of the theory. Speci…cally, 1. In the treatment where the returns to entrepreneurial e¤ort are low, the revenues in the equity auction are statistically signi…cantly higher than those in a debt auctions.
2. In the treatment where the returns to entrepreneurial e¤ort are intermediate (and where, for the calibrated values, the theory predicts that debt auctions will outperform equity auctions), the revenues in the equity auction are statistically signi…cantly higher than those in a debt auctions.
3. In all auctions, the higher quality business idea is funded with probability close to 100%.
While the comparative static predictions are largely supportive of the theory, the market level results suggest systematic deviations from the theory level predictions. Deriving and estimating a structural model for revenues, we show that winners'bids re ‡ect too high weighting on the highest private value and too low weighting on the second highest private value -all relative to the theoretical predictions. To explore the e¤ect of erroneous bidding behavior on these results, we test di¤erences is allocation e¢ ciencies -the probability that the winner is the entrepreneur with the highest project value -across treatment cells and rounds. While we …nd that overall allocation e¢ ciency is high, systematic deviations related to auction form and learning are observed.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 we sketch the model and derive a characterization of equilibrium bidding behavior in debt and equity auctions with both private information and moral hazard. Section 3 outlines the design of the experiment. Section 4 reports the experiment results as they relate to the comparative static predictions of the theoretical model while section 5 discusses level prediction tests of the model. The structural model used in some of the estimations is contained in an appendix.
Theory
Consider a setting in which there are two entrepreneurs competing for resources from a venture capital …rm to fund a risky project. Each entrepreneur currently operates a small business that has a commonly known and identical value of m: Each entrepreneur has access to a risky project which requires …nancing (and other inputs) from a venture capital …rm. A venture capital …rm possesses this package of resources in su¢ cient quantity to …nance exactly one project. If an entrepreneur receives a package of resources from the VC, it then undertakes the project. The payo¤ from the project of entrepreneur i depends on its inherent quality (v i ) and the degree of entrepreneurial e¤ort, e i 2 f0; 1g : In particular, suppose with probability p a project succeeds and produces cash equivalent to v i (1 + e i ), where denoted the returns to e¤ort: Otherwise, a project fails and pays zero to all parties. 1 Thus, when entrepreneur i undertakes a project of quality v i and exerts e¤ort e i ; then the payo¤ from the project is Notice that there is a trade-o¤ between undertaking the project (even on the most favorable possible terms) and risking a failure versus retaining the "safe" outside option, m;and avoiding the costs associated with failed projects. Since our focus is on how the investment decision is a¤ected by the structure of the negotiation between the entrepreneurs and the VC rather than whether to undertake any investment at all, we assume that the quality of any of the ideas is such that it is socially optimal 1 We assume that the costs of a failure strictly exceed m:
to undertake the risky project. Formally, this amounts to the condition:
Suppose that an entrepreneur obtains VC …nancing on the following terms: the entrepreneur retains a fraction i of the company and has debt service D i : In that case, the expected payo¤ to the entrepreneur is
In this case, the entrepreneur should optimally exert e¤ort (e i = 1) provided that
which we may then simplify to
That is, the entrepreneur's net expected return to e¤ort, p i (v i C)) exceeds her cost of e¤ort, 1; where C denotes the change in debt liability associated with a successful project under high e¤ort.
Absent the support of the VC, the value of entrepreneur i's company is simply EU i = m; and the optimal amount of entrepreneurial e¤ort is zero.
Since neither the entrepreneurs'quality of ideas nor their e¤ort is directly observable nor contractible by the VC, the key problem faced by the VC is in designing a contractual scheme with an entrepreneur to "solve" the combined adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Of course, the objective of the manager of the VC is to maximize the expected return of the investors subject to some constraints described below: Suppose that if the resources of the VC are put to neither of the two projects, then the investors of the VC withdraw their funds and the manager of the VC …rm su¤ers in…nite negative utility from suddenly becoming unemployed. Therefore, the VC cannot credibly commit not to fund one of the entrepreneurs.
We shall consider the following schemes: 1. Equity "auction": We will compare the above procedure with an alternative. In an equity auction, entrepreneurs compete by o¤ering the VC fractional ownership of the company in exchange for the VC's resources. We model this as an open outcry auction-the entrepreneur o¤ering the larger ownership share is the "winner"of the auction at the bid amount.
2. Debt "auction": Suppose that the entrepreneurs compete with one another by o¤ering the VC debt contracts in exchange for VC support. Again, we model this process as an open outcry auction. The "bidder"o¤ering the higher amount of debt repayment in exchange for the resources of the VC is the "winner"of the auction at the bid amount.
Analysis of Equilibrium in Equity Auctions
First, we consider the equity auction and determine when it is optimal for the winning entrepreneur to undertake e¤ort.
Lemma 1 Winning entrepreneur i should undertake e¤ort if an only if the winning price is less than
Proof. Suppose that the current "price"in the auction is 1 : Then, if entrepreneur i won at this price, it would be optimal to undertake e¤ort if and only if
We are now in a position to reason backwards in the auction to determine equilibrium bidding strategies. As we show below, these depend on the parameter values pertaining to the returns to e¤ort. Case 1. pv i 1: Clearly, when v i p 1;the returns to e¤ort are never su¢ cient to justify any e¤ort "investment" on the part of the entrepreneur. In that case, the weakly dominant strategy for the entrepreneur is to bid up to the point where expected value of the company under no e¤ort is equal to the outside option in the event no …nancing is obtained. Speci…cally, let 1 0 i denote the "drop-out price; then
which is a well-de…ned bidding strategy by equation (1) : Case 2. pv i > 1: Now, for prices that are su¢ ciently low, the entrepreneur is willing to undertake e¤ort. Again, consider the strategy where the entrepreneur bids up to the point where expected value of the company under positive e¤ort is equal to the outside option in the event no …nancing is obtained. Speci…cally, let 1 1 i denote the "drop-out price; then
which is a well-behaved bidding strategy since pv i > 1:
Provided that 1
;then the above drop-out strategy is weakly dominant. That is, when
Therefore, we have shown that if (m 1) v i m 0;then an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies is to bid up to a price 1 1 i and exert high e¤ort conditional on winning.
Suppose that (m 1) v i m < 0;in that case, 1
:Therefore, the bidding strategy must change once the price
is exceeded. In particular, for all prices 1 >
It is not optimal to exert e¤ort. In that case, the drop out condition is exactly as in case 1. It may be readily shown that 1
In a equity auction, an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies is for bidder i to drop out at price 1 i where
Together with the e¤ort strategy in Lemma 1, this comprises a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies in an equity auction.
We now argue that the equity auction has the property that the higher valued idea is funded with probability one. To see this, suppose that v 1 > v 2 : There are two cases to consider: Case 1. 
where the strict inequality follows from the fact v 1 > v 2 and the weak inequality follows from the fact that (m 1) v 1 m 0:Therefore, entrepreneur 1's project is funded.
Hence, we have shown that
Proposition 2
In an equity auction under the equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies given in Proposition 1, the higher valued idea is funded with probability one.
What is the expected return to the VC under this auction? There are three possibilities to consider, either (i) the winning entrepreneur exerts high e¤ort and the price is set as though high e¤ort will be undertaken; (ii) the winning entrepreneur exerts low e¤ort and the price is set as though low e¤ort will be undertaken; or (iii) the winning entrepreneur exerts high e¤ort and the price is set as though low e¤ort will be undertaken. The fourth possibility, a price set as though high e¤ort will be undertaken followed by a low e¤ort choice from the winning entrepreneur is inconsistent with subgame perfect equilibrium. The expected return in each of the possibilities is as follows:
(i)
(ii)
Using Proposition 1, we now determine the parameter values in which each of three possibilities arise. ;then the winning entrepreneur exerts low e¤ort and the price is set in anticipation of low e¤ort Otherwise, the winning entrepreneur exerts high e¤ort and the price is set in anticipation of low e¤ort.
Case 1: pv 1 1 then hlow; lowi Case 2:
Analysis of Equilibrium in Debt Auctions
Next, we turn to debt auctions. Before proceeding, it is useful to establish several preliminary facts about equilibrium bidding in a debt auction. As above, de…ne D Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
In that case, the expected payo¤ to the entrepreneur in the event that she "wins"and is awarded the …nancing is
Therefore, it is a pro…table deviation for the entrepreneur simply to stop bidding before reaching this price. An identical argument establishes the claim for D 
Lemma 3 i and undertaking e¤ort was not optimal. In that case, the expected payo¤ from undertaking e¤ort for a bid D 0 i is at least m; whereas, by construction, it is exactly equal to m in the case of undertaking no e¤ort. This is a contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that D 
To summarize
Proposition 3 In a debt auction, an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies is for bidder i to bid according to
We now argue that the debt auction has the property that the higher valued idea is funded with probability one. To see this, suppose that v 1 > v 2 : There are three cases to consider: Case 1. 
Hence entrepreneur 1's project is funded. Hence, we have shown that Proposition 4 In a debt auction under the equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies given in Proposition 1, the higher valued idea is funded with probability one.
What is the expected return to the VC under this auction? The expected payo¤ to the VC when v 1 > v 2 is as follows:
Revenue Comparisons
Proposition 5 Suppose that (i) pv 1 1 or (ii) pv 1 > 1 and pv 2 < 1:Then, for all realizations, v 1 > v 2 , the equity auction yields greater revenues to the VC than does the debt auction.
Proof. Notice that under either condition, entrepreneur 2 bids in the debt and equity auctions anticipating undertaking zero e¤ort. Hence,
Di¤erencing these expressions one obtains
Proposition 6 Suppose that pv 1 > 1 and (m 1) v 2 m 0:or (ii) pv 2 < 1:Then, for all realizations, v 1 > v 2 , the equity auction yields greater revenues to the VC than does the debt auction.
Proof. Notice that, when pv 2 > 1 and (m 1) v 2 m 0; then under both the equity and debt auctions, high e¤ort is undertaken and the price is set anticipating high e¤ort. Hence
Di¤erencing these two expressions, one obtains
The main lesson from the proposition is that, when the returns to e¤ort are either su¢ ciently high that undertaking high e¤ort is still pro…table in an equity auction or so low that undertaking e¤ort is not optimal in either auction, then the equity auction always outperforms the debt auction.
Finally, we consider the intermediate cases:Here, the trade-o¤ is more complicated. Entrepreneur 2 will bid as though high e¤ort will be undertaken in the debt auction and as though low e¤ort will be undertaken in the equity auction. For the equity auction, the expected revenues also depend on whether entrepreneur 1 undertakes e¤ort. That is, whether
or not. As we shall see below, the revenue ranking in this case depends heavily on the gap between v 1 and v 2 : For future reference de…ne
If v 1 and v 2 are "close"; that is v 1 v 2 < ; the debt auction yields greater revenues to the VC than does the equity auction.
If v 1 and v 2 are not close, that is, v 1 v 2 ; the equity auction yields greater revenues to the VC than does the debt auction.
Proof. Under the above conditions, the price in the debt auction is set in anticipation of high e¤ort and high e¤ort is undertaken while the price in the equity auction is set in anticipation of low e¤ort and low e¤ort is undertaken. Thus, the revenue comparison is as follows:
Di¤erencing these two expressions
The sign of this expression depends on whether
; the equity auction yields greater revenues to the VC than does the debt auction.
Proof. Under the above conditions, the price in the debt auction is set in anticipation of high e¤ort and high e¤ort is undertaken while the price in the equity auction is set in anticipation of low e¤ort and high e¤ort is undertaken. Thus, the revenue comparison is as follows:
Despite the complexity of the parameter conditions, the results of the last two propositions are intuitive: When v 1 is su¢ ciently high relative to v 2 , the equity auction outperforms the debt auction simply by linking the payment received by the VC to v 1 : In the case where only low e¤ort is undertaken, the required gap for this e¤ect to dominate is whereas, when the incentive diluting e¤ect of the equity auction is not a concern (as in Proposition 4), the required gap between v 1 and v 2 falls in proportion to the returns to e¤ort-to v 1 : In contrast, the VC obtains little bene…t from linking its payment received to the value of v 1 when the valuations of the two entrepreneurs are relatively equal. In that case, the superior incentive e¤ects of the debt auction dominate.
Experimental Design

General
The experiment consisted of 14 sessions conducted at the University of California at Berkeley Experimental Social Sciences Laboratory (XLab) during the Spring 2004 semester. Eight subjects participated in each session, and no subject appeared in more than one session. Subjects were recruited from a distribution list comprised of primarily economics, business and engineering undergraduate students. Participants received a show-up fee of $3 and an additional performance based pay of $0-$40 for a session lasting around 2 hours.
All sessions started with subjects being seated in front of a computer terminal and given a set of instructions, which were then read aloud by the experimenter. Throughout the session, no communication between subjects was permitted and all choices and information were transmitted via the computer terminal.
The session then consisted of three phases of 12 periods each. During the …rst and last phase subject participating as "entrepreneurs" bid with debt while in the second phase "entrepreneurs" bid with equity. Thus. the sequence of sessions is Debt, equity, Debt.
At the beginning of each period, subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four. Within each group a single unit of funding was sold at an English auction. Each subject received an independently and identically draw from a uniform distribution with a support of 0 to 100, which corresponded to the value of project (if it is funded) to the entrepreneur. Each entrepreneur then submitted bids in a computerized outcry process subject to improvement rule (this mechanism mirrors the one used by large art auction houses as Christie's and Sotheby's). The period ended if no new bids arrived in a period of 15 seconds, during which subjects received a "going, going, gone" warning message. Each bid included two elements -a price and an e¤ort decision. While the former is standard, the later denotes entrepreneur's decision whether or not they would opt to increase the value of the project (i.e. exert e¤ort) by incurring a known cost. While the bene…t resulting from exerting e¤ort accrued to the project being …nanced, the cost was borne completely by the bidder. The terminal provided a calculator which allowed subjects to compute their earnings given di¤erent inputs of winning bids and e¤ort decisions.
At the start of each period subjects were endowed with ten points each. During the debt auctions, bids were interpreted as points. Thus, winning bid earnings were equal to ten points plus private and e¤ort values minus bid and e¤ort cost. During the equity auction, bids were interpreted as percentage points. Thus, winning bid earnings were equal to 100 minus percentage point bid times 10 points plus private value, e¤ort value, minus e¤ort cost 2 . Losing bid earned ten points. At the end of each period, subjects'earnings were calculated and displayed on their interface.
Discussion of the design
The experiment was designed around two treatments: security type (debt / equity) and returns to e¤ort (low / high). The main purpose of this design is to test the revenue ranking predictions. When e¤ort returns are low, the moral hazard problem is immaterial and equity auctions yield higher revenues to the seller than debt auctions. On the other hand, when e¤ort returns are high, the moral hazard problem becomes sizable and debt auctions yield higher revenues to the seller. The auction type treatment was implemented across subjects so that some sessions were parametrized with low returns to e¤ort while other sessions were parameterized with high returns to e¤ort. The auction type treatment was implemented within subjects so that each subject participated in both debt and equity auctions.
One contribution of the study is to model the auction in the lab as an ascending bid English (or open outcry) auction. While laboratory implementations of this auction typically use a so-called clock auction design where bidders need only decide at what price to drop out of the auction, we use a more natural form of the English auction. This mechanism has a number of advantages over the commonly used …rst and second price sealed bid auctions. First, it is familiar to subjects and thus easy to understand. Since the securities with which subjects bid are somewhat non-standard, we believed that an intuitive mechanism was important. Second, while English auction is theoretically equivalent to the canonical sealed bid auctions, the strategies in the former are substantially simpler, making it less prone to potential cognitive biases. Third, this auction mechanism is invariant to risk preferences (see for example Maskin and Riley (1984) ). Previous studies suggested that deviations from risk-neutrality may be consequential for results obtained in under sealed bid auctions (see Kagel (1995) for a review of this literature).
We parametrized the experiment such that in the "low returns" sessions the e¤ort value was low enough to make it unpro…table for player, in either the debt or equity auctions, to exert e¤ort. In the "high returns" sessions, e¤ort was optimally exerted by the winning bidder in all debt auction instances but only in small fraction of equity auctions. For simplicity, we kept the cost of e¤ort the same for all sessions. The speci…c return-to-e¤ort values were determined so as to generate a powerful test of the revenue ranking predictions while making bidders decisions manageable in terms of their complexity. Given the real-time nature of the auction, we wanted to avoid cases were theoretical e¤ort choice switches during the bidding process.
To summarize, each session was conducted using one of the two e¤ort conditions ("low returns" or "high returns"). Under both treatments, outside value, m, was equal to 10; private value of the project, v i , was drawn from a uniform distribution with support of [0; 100], and the cost of e¤ort , c, was equal to 20 3 : Returns to e¤ort, , were set to 0:1 in the "low" case, and to 1:3 in the "high" case. These parameters were chosen such that the expected loss from socially ine¢ cient e¤ort choice in the equity auctions overweighted the expected bene…ts arising from linking the revenues to the highest private value. The e¤ort returns needed to be su¢ ciently high to induce e¤ort exertion in the debt case but not high enough to induce e¤ort exertion in the equity bidding case.
The equilibrium predictions for each type of auction under each treatment is given in table 1. The table provides mean predictions of sellers'revenues (in points), normalized revenues and e¤ort decisions, which are de…ned below:
Revenues: This is simply a measure of the revenues obtained by the seller in a given auction (measured in the experimental points).
Normalized Revenues: Since the valuations of each of the bidders are drawn randomly, there may be variations in revenues that are purely driven by the realizations of the draws. A more useful measure of the performance of an auction is the fraction of the maximum theoretically possible surplus captured by the seller. To take a simple example, suppose that the surplus available in auction A was $10 and the seller received $7. In auction B, the available surplus was $5 and the seller obtained $4. Then, even though the revenues from auction B, measured in levels, are lower than those under auction A, the percentage of surplus captured by the seller is higher. Thus, given the variation across auctions in the available surplus, this measure of auction performance seems useful.
E¤ort choices:
The measure for e¤ort indicates whether the winning bidder chose to pay the costs required to "upgrade" the asset. We code this as "1" if e¤ort was exerted in a given round of the experiment and "0" otherwise. 
Overview
We start by presenting descriptive statistics from the experiment, which are provided in table 2. The table is divided into four columns re ‡ecting the four di¤erent treatment "cells"in the experiment. The …rst two columns correspond to the low returns cases -under the debt and equity bidding. The next two columns correspond to the high return cases under both security types. 
Low returns High returns
There are roughly twice as many rounds under the equity columns as there are under the debt columns 4 . This is because of our ABA design where debt auctions occur both at the beginning and at the end of each experimental session.
The rationale behind this design is as follows. Pilot studies suggested that subjects'learning was much easier in going from debt to equity auctions than vice-versa. Since we are interested in equilibrium behavior, we decided to start the sessions with rounds of debt auctions that serve to familiarizing subjects with the bidding process. The results suggest that most of the learning process is completed by round six. To illustrate that, we split all debt rounds into four groups of six rounds each: 1-6, 7-12, 25-30 and 31-36, 5 . We construct a number measures that intend to capture the dynamics of bidding activity: bidding intensity (average number of bids per round), overbidding (average amount by which winning bidder overbid relative to the theoretical predictions), and ine¢ ciency (the fraction of times the funding was provided to the highest venture value). The results are presented separately for the low and high return sessions in …gures 1 and 2.
In both the low and the high return variants we …nd dramatic decrease in ine¢ -ciency and overbidding, from the initial rounds (1-6) to the subsequent rounds (7-12 and 25-36), is observed. We do not …nd similar changes when comparing the …rst and second half of the third phase rounds (rounds 25-30 vs. 31-36). 
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Further, the intensity of bidding seems to be fairly stable across rounds in the both variants, while there is a downward (upward) trend in the high (low) returns variant. These results suggest that presentation e¤ects are immaterial since the debt auction rounds conducted just before the equity auction rounds appear to be indistinguishable from the debt auction rounds conducted immediately after the equity auction rounds. To summarize, it appears that learning takes place during the initial rounds but the process stabilizes halfway into the …rst phase of rounds.
Comparative Static Predictions
As we saw in table 1, for the parameter values presented in the experiment, the theory model suggests that we test the following four hypotheses about comparative static e¤ects on revenues and e¤ort choices:
Hypothesis 1: When returns to e¤ort are low, revenues and normalized revenues are higher in equity auction than in a debt auction.
Hypothesis 2: When returns to e¤ort are high, revenues and normalized revenues are higher in a debt auction than in a equity auction.
Hypothesis 3: When returns to e¤ort are low, the e¤ort choice is the same under debt as well as equity auctions. 
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Hypothesis 4: When returns to e¤ort are high, more e¤ort is undertaken under a debt auction than under a equity auction.
We examine these hypotheses under a variety of speci…cations and ways of handling the data and …nd strong support for all four hypotheses regardless of the handling of the data or the particular speci…cation employed.
Session Level Analysis First, we examine the four hypotheses using the session as the unit of observation. The justi…cation for this handling of the data is that, since subjects participated in multiple rounds, interacted with one another, and learned over the course of the experiment, arguably the observations should not be treated as independent. Thus, an extremely conservative view of the data is that each session constitutes a unit of observation. In terms of our experiments, this leaves us with only 14 data points (9 obtained in the low returns condition and 5 obtained in the high returns condition). 
Sign test (p-value) Sign test (p-value)
In this table we subtract the average levels (within session) of revenues, normalized revenues and fraction of e¤ort choice in the debt rounds (25-36) from the average levels in the shares rounds (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) encing the average revenues, normalized revenues and e¤orts for shares versus debt auctions session by session. The results of this are reported in Table 3 above. In that table, we test the null hypothesis that each of the three performance measures are equal the same across auction forms against the one-sided alternative implied by hypotheses 1-4 using a Mann-Whitney sign test. According to hypothesis 1, the shares auction should produce higher revenues (or normalized revenues) compared to debt auctions in the low returns sessions. As Table  3 shows, in 8 of the 9 sessions, the average revenues were in the predicted direction. The di¤erences are statistically signi…cant at the 2 percent level.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the revenue ranking will reverse in the high returns sessions. As the table shows, average revenues were higher under debt auctions compared to shares auctions in all 5 sessions. Once again, the di¤erence in revenues is statistically signi…cant-this time at the 3% level.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that there should be no di¤erence in e¤ort choices across the two auction forms for the low returns sessions. Notice that, in 2 of the sessions, higher average e¤ort is undertaken in a shares auction than in a debt auction. The reverse is true for 2 sessions as well, while for the remaining 5 sessions, average e¤ort is exactly the same under the two auction forms. Taken together, this suggests no di¤erence in average e¤ort undertaken across auction forms. Formally, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of a zero treatment e¤ect at the 68 percent level.
Hypothesis 4, however, predicts that in high returns treatments, shares auctions will undermine e¤ort choices relative to debt auctions. The data in Table 3 strongly supports this prediction. In all 5 sessions, average e¤ort is lower under a shares auction than under a debt auction and the di¤erences are considerable. Formally, we …nd the di¤erences in e¤ort are statistically signi…cant at the 3% level.
Market Level Analysis
In the preceding analysis, we excluded the …rst twelve rounds owing to learning e¤ects and treated the session as the unit of observation. Yet, this leaves unanswered the question of how important these learning e¤ects (or their exclusion) are to the conclusions with respect to hypotheses 1-4. Moreover, the preceding analysis examined the results e¤ectively pairwise across auction forms for a given high or low returns treatment. It is of some interest to examine the strength of the interaction terms against the level e¤ects of the high or low returns treatment itself. For these reasons, we now examine the four hypotheses using the interaction of a group of subjects in a particular "market"as the unit of observation. Since these markets took place over time during the experiment, this lets us isolate some learning e¤ects on market outcomes. Moreover, by pooling across auction type and returns treatment, we are able to separately identify level from interaction e¤ects present in the data.
While the di¤erences shown are signi…cant using parametric and non-parametric tests that use mean levels across samples obtained from the two security types, we examine the robustness of the four hypotheses using regression analysis. In what will follow we take a slightly less conservative view of the data and treat each "round"of the experiment as an observation, while explicitly incorporating the fact that errors are possibly subject to autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity within each session. Indeed, it is precisely this sort of worry about session e¤ects that suggested pooling by session in the …rst place. However, clustering by session might, theoretically, allay this concern somewhat. Further, using regression analysis allows us to explicitly control for various types of learning e¤ects (and which motivated omitting the …rst six rounds from the session level analysis above).
Speci…cally, we run the following regression:
where measure st denotes one of the three measures of auction performance given above for round t of session s: The variable auction form t is equal to one if a equity auction occurred in period t and zero if a debt auction occurred in that period. The variable agency e¤ect s is equal to zero if returns to e¤ort are low and it is equal to one if returns to e¤ort are high, in a given session s: The matrix X st is a matrix of controls for learning e¤ects over the course of a session. Speci…cally, we add a linear and squared time trends. Additionally, the matrix X st includes a control, learning st ; which is equal to the number of previous rounds conducted within the same security type, in period t, session s. For instance, if period t were the kth period in which a equity auction was run, then the value of the learning control would be equal to k (rather than t). This accounts for the fact that learning may occur at di¤erent rates for di¤erent auction forms. Thus,
Of course, we continue to be concerned that past market interactions could a¤ect current market interactions as subjects in a given session repeatedly interact. To allow for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of market outcomes in a given session, we Regressing the various measures of revenues and e¤ort on the X variables and clustering by session to account for possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity resulting from subject interactions within each session, we obtain the following coe¢ cient estimates summarized in Table 4.   7 To see how the regression coe¢ cients bear on the hypotheses listed above, it is helpful to write out the interaction term explicitly. That is, all else equal, measure st = 0 + 1 auction form t + 2 agency e¤ects s + There are four cases we need to consider, {debt, low returns}, {equity, low returns}, {debt, high returns}, and {equity, high returns}. Since auction form takes on the value of zero in the case of debt auction and agency e¤ects takes on the value of zero when returns to e¤ort are low, we obtain that in the: {debt, low returns}, measure = 0 {equity, low returns}, measure = 0 + 1 {debt, high returns}, measure = 0 + 2 {equity, high returns}, measure = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 Therefore, the di¤erences in average levels of the dependent measure when comparing equity and debt auctions in the low returns case, measure fequity;low returnsg measure fdebt;low returnsg , is equal to 1 . Likewise, the di¤erence in between the equity and debt auctions in the high returns case, measure fequity;high returnsg measure fdebt;high returnsg , is equal to 1 + 3 .
According to Hypothesis 1, when returns to e¤ort are low, equity auction should yield higher revenues and normalized revenues than debt auctions. Thus, 1 is predicted to be positive when the dependent variables are revenues or normalized revenues. Indeed, we …nd that these coe¢ cient are estimated to be positive (61:77 for revenues and 0:812 for normalized revenues) and statistically di¤erent from zero (at the 1% level). Hypothesis 2 suggests that in the high returns case, debt auctions should yield higher revenues and normalized revenues than do equity auction, implying that 1 + 3 < 0. We …nd that this sum is negative for both revenues ( 23: 087) and normalized revenues ( 0:118 9) with statistical signi…cance of 1%.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that e¤ort decisions should be the same across the auction forms when returns to e¤ort are low. That is, estimated 1 in the e¤ort choice regression should not be signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Indeed, the results suggest that the value of this coe¢ cient (:0126) is indistinguishable from zero at conventional signi…cance level. According to hypothesis 4, e¤ort choices should be signi…cantly di¤erent across the security forms when returns to e¤ort are high. The results strongly support the hypothesis. We …nd that estimated 1 + 3 is negative ( 9:49) and signi…cant at con…dence level of 1%.
The coe¢ cients that capture across rounds and within security form learning do not appear to be statistically di¤erent from zero. Nonetheless, the sign of the linear round trend coe¢ cient in the revenues and normalized revenues regressions appear to be positive. This is consistent with the intuition that learning decreases overbidding, resulting in lower revenues to the seller. The e¤ect of within-auction-form seem to be negligible in the presence of time trend variables. The results suggest that while learning probably takes place, the process'e¤ects are not signi…cant when considering the complete set of rounds.
Summary
The session and market level data strongly supports the comparative static implications of the theory model. When returns to e¤ort are low, shares auctions signi…cantly outperform debt auctions; however, the reverse is true when the returns to e¤ort are high. The key distinction in the revenue ranking is that competition in shares auctions undermines e¤ort incentives and, as we saw above, leads to signi…cant reductions in e¤ort levels of the winning bidder.
Level Predictions of the Theory
While it is reassuring that the comparative static predictions of the model are borne out, the model also o¤ers more detailed predictions about the levels of winning bids, the distribution of scare venture capital across …rms, and about e¤ort choices as a function of the current bid level. We investigate these questions in this section. To examine these questions, we derive a structural model of revenue and e¤ort choices using the tractable expressions for these obtained in the theory.
Structural Estimation
We start by deriving a structural model for revenues under both debt and equity auctions and in the two e¤ort return conditions. Recall that the auctions were run under four di¤erent treatments: debt versus equity interacted with high versus low returns to e¤ort.
In the case of a debt auction under the low returns treatment, it is never optimal for a bidder to undertake e¤ort. Therefore, revenues are simply given by
In the case of a debt auction under the high returns treatment, the theory predicts that the price will be set by the value of the object to the bidder with the second highest valuation. This, in turn, depends on whether that bidder's valuation is su¢ -ciently high that there is a positive return to e¤ort. For the parameter speci…cation in the experiment, this then implies. In case two, it is always optimal to exert e¤ort in the debt auction when returns to e¤ort are high. Therefore revenues are given by
In the case of an equity auction under the low returns treatment, it is never optimal for a bidder to undertake e¤ort. Therefore, revenues are simply given by
To next this expression with the other treatments, we can linearize equation 10 by using …rst-order Taylor approximation around v 1 = v 2 = m to obtain
The case of an equity auction under the high returns treatment is more complex. As noted above, it is sometimes optimal to undertake e¤ort and sometimes not depending on the realizations of v 1 and v 2 : At the same time, give the parameterization of the experiment only a subset of cases is attainable. Recall that we set p = 1; m = 10; E = 20 (cost of exerting e¤ort); v i 2 [0; 100] and = 1:3 (in the high return session). Therefore, pv i < m for all v i meaning that bidders'dominant strategy would always be to bid in anticipation of low e¤ort choice. The relevant expected revenues cases are represented by two sub-cases
After simplifying we get that
Using once again …rst order Taylor approximation we get that: Since the top case above is identical to the low returns to e¤ort in equity auctions we will limit our analysis to the bottom case, where the winner exerts e¤ort. This formulation allows us to clearly identify the driving forces behind revenues under all relevant conditions. In debt auctions, revenues are a function of the second highest value only, while in equity auction revenues dependent on the second and the …rst highest value. We also see that revenues become more sensitive to the second highest value when moving from low to high returns settings in both debt and equity auctions. At the same time, the sensitivity of equity revenues to the highest private value goes down when in high returns to e¤ort condition. Thus, the linkage principal weakens as result of the moral hazard problem.
All cases can be represented in a linear form
While each implies di¤erent values for ; ;and . Case one implies f = 0; = 0; = 1g, case two implies f = 20; = 0; = 2:3g, case three implies f = 0; = equity , which takes on the value of 1 in the case of equity auction, and D high , which takes on the value of 1 in the case of high returns to e¤ort.
In this framework, we get that
Combing these cases with the restrictions described above we generate predictions for sets of f ! ; ! ; ! g. We present the estimation results of equation 14 using robust cluster regression in We see that the support for the level predictions of the theory are mixed. First, looking at the results under low returns to e¤ort, we …nd that in line with the theoretical predictions, debt auctions load more on the second highest valuation and less on the highest valuation; the opposite happens in equity auctions. Second, debt auction results suggest that the sensitivity of revenues to the second highest valuation increases when going from low returns environment (:804) to high returns environment (2:01), once again supporting the theory's predictions. At the same time we see that in debt auctions, revenues are not sensitive enough to the second highest valuation and are too sensitive to the highest valuation (though with marginal statistical signi…cance). Last, the theory predicts that in the equity auction, sensitivity to highest private value relative to the second highest value should increase when going from low to high returns settings. The pattern we observe concur with this prediction; the coe¢ cient on the highest private (second highest) value is 0:79 (0:29) in the low returns to e¤ort and it is 1:64 (0:15) in the high returns to e¤ort.
E¢ ciency
Recall that we have a number of theorems that indicate that the adverse selection problem is perfectly solved by either debt or shares auctions, irrespective of the returns to e¤ort. In this section, we use a probit model to estimate the probability that the higher quality project is funded across auction forms and e¤ort returns conditions. To estimate this model, we once again use the speci…cation in the righthand side of equation (5). We use a binary left-hand side variable for measure it ; which we code as "1" when the winner of the auction is the bidder with the highest v i in the market and "0" otherwise. The coe¢ cient estimates of the marginal e¤ects of each of the factors on the probability of an e¢ cient allocation for this speci…cation are reported in Table 6 below. As Table 6 shows, the baseline probability of an e¢ cient allocation is quite high (85%) across all treatments and rounds. The coe¢ cients for learning e¤ects indicate that, as subjects gain experience over the course of a session, e¢ ciency improves at about a 2 percent rate per round of the experiment. Turning to the treatment e¤ects, recall that, according to Propositions 2 and 4, the theory predicts no di¤erences across treatments in the e¢ ciency of allocations. However, one might expect that, given the cognitive complexity of bidding in a shares auction, especially in the high returns treatment, compared to bidding in a debt auction, that the former will perform less well by the e¢ ciency metric. As Table 6 shows, the marginal e¤ect of using a shares auction is to decrease the probability of an e¢ cient allocation by almost 16 percent, which reduces to 15 percent in the case of high returns. Thus, the complexity of bidding in shares does have a signi…cant adverse e¤ect on e¢ ciency, but the added complexity of the e¤ort choice in the high returns treatment does not appear to exacerbate this e¤ect. Indeed, in debt auctions under the high returns treatment, e¢ ciency increases by about 8 percent.
Why might it be the case that e¢ ciency improves under the high returns treatments? On possible explanation is that bidders make zero mean mistakes and hence, when the values of the highest and second highest bidders are relatively close to one another, these mistakes lead to ine¢ ciency. Under the high returns treatment, especially under a debt auction, the average gap in the valuation of the highest and second highest bidder is magni…ed by the multiplier on e¤ort. Therefore, one would expect that, adding a control for the magnitude of the gap between v 1 and v 2 interacted with a dummy for whether the treatment is high returns or not would drastically reduce the magnitude of the e¤ect of the high returns treatment alone. We modi…ed the speci…cation in equation (5) to allow for this possibility and found that it had little e¤ect on the magnitude or signi…cance of the e¤ect of the high returns treatment on e¢ ciency. Thus, random mistakes alone cannot account for di¤erences in e¢ ciency between the high and low returns treatments in debt auctions.
While the economic magnitudes of the marginal e¤ects appear large, it is important to note that, given a pseudo-R 2 of only 0.07, much of the variation in e¢ ciency across auctions is driven by non-systematic factors. Moreover, taken together with estimates of revenue di¤erences across treatments, one sees that the adverse e¤ect on allocations in shares auctions is more than o¤set by revenue gains from "linkage" of the winning bidder's payment to the underlying value of the asset. In other words, equity auctions continue to outperform debt auctions in low returns treatments despite being less e¢ cient in their allocations.
Appendix
Structural model
In developing the structural model, we claim that 
